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Abstract 
The study analyzes a unique time period of sustained deflation from 1867 to 1896, followed by 
sustained reflation after 1896. We use these periods to test two hypotheses concerning the impact on 
NYSE trading volumes and seat prices. The first is the “liquidity-trading” hypothesis, which 
hypothesizes that liquidity trading, a component of total trading volume, is positively correlated with 
interest rates. The second is the price-volume relationship, which hypothesizes a positive relationship 
between stock prices returns and changes in trading volume. These hypotheses suggest that NYSE 
trading volume should fall (rise) with falling (rising) stock prices and interest rates. We find strong 
support for both hypotheses, and additionally show that the impact of stock market prices on trading 
volumes is highly asymmetrical. As well, the study argues and finds evidence that the high level of 
systematic risk found in the pricing of NYSE seats is another reflection of the price-volume relationship. 
Therefore, the study finds strong evidence of a link between deflation, reflation and market liquidity as 
reflected in trading volumes and the pricing of NYSE seats.  
Keywords 
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1. Introduction 
How do periods of deflation and reflation impact financial market prices and trading volumes? As 
Saunders (2000) discusses, there is only a limited amount of such data from which to draw conclusions. 
Despite this limited experience, the relevance of the topic has increased with the low inflation and 
potential deflation that has occurred post-subprime crisis. This study analyzes a period of sustained 
price deflation that occurred from 1867 to 1896, a 29-year period. After 1896, a sharp reversal occurred 
to price reflation (Note 1). These periods of sharp deflation and reflation allow the study to construct 
powerful tests of theories concerning the determinants of NYSE trading volumes and relatedly the 
pricing of NYSE seats. Both of these reflect aspects of the liquidity of the NYSE securities market. 
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The study tests two hypotheses concerning how deflation and reflation might impact trading volumes in 
equity markets. First, a period of deflation, and related low nominal interest rates, reduces the 
opportunity cost of holding cash, and in turn reduces the need for liquidity trading. Saunders (2000, p. 
1070) discusses this hypothesis and presents data showing the fall in NYSE trading activity during the 
deflation period of the Great Depression. In turn, low trading activity increases the transaction costs of 
market makers, which then further reduces trading volumes. We term this the “liquidity-trading” 
hypothesis, i.e., that part of trading volume related to liquidity trading is positively correlated with 
interest rates. 
Second, deflation might impact trading volume through the so-called price-volume relationship, which 
hypothesizes a positive relationship between stock price returns and changes in trading volume. 
Karpoff (1987) posed this as the “asymmetric volume-price change hypothesis”, which hypothesizes 
that positive stock price changes will have a larger impact on trading volumes than negative stock price 
changes. Karpoff hypothesizes that this asymmetry results from the impact of costly short sales on 
trading activity, since costly short positions would reduce trading on bearish news. Karpoff (1987) 
presents evidence in support of the price-volume relationship in stock and bond markets, but concludes 
that the relationship is absent from futures markets, where the cost of short and long positions is 
symmetrical. Therefore, asymmetry in the cost of taking positions in the stock and bond markets leads 
to the asymmetric version of the price-volume relationship. 
Behavioral aspects of trading can also play a role in the price-volume relationship. Griffin et al. (2007) 
present evidence of (1) the participation effect that increased awareness of rising stock prices can 
increase public participation in trading, (2) the disposition effect that traders are reluctant to sell losers 
in down markets, but trade more frequently in rising markets to lock in gains, and (3) the 
over-confidence effect that trading volumes increase in rising markets as traders accumulate profits 
from past successful trading. All three of these effects indicate that trading volumes should increase 
with market prices. These behavioral effects provide additional support for the asymmetric 
price-volume relationship, complementing the costly-short sale explanation. Statman et al. (2006) also 
report results in support of the overconfidence hypothesis and the disposition effect. 
Griffin et al. (2007) also find that the institutional and regulatory structure of trading can impact trading 
volumes. The study reports that markets with less trading support (through specialists and other market 
makers) show reduced trading volumes, and that stock markets with weaker investor protections show 
a stronger price-volume relationship. Finally, markets dominated by retail investors show greater 
momentum trading, and thus a stronger price-volume relationship. These results suggest that we might 
expect a stronger price-volume relationship during the study‟s pre-WW I data period, due to the more 
primitive institutional and regulatory structure of NYSE trading at the time and the dominance of 
trading by retail investors. 
The pricing of NYSE seats during the same pre-WW I period should also reflect the price-volume 
relationship. Our analysis addresses some issues similar to Davis, Neal and White (2007) and Schwert 
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(1977), but is unique in hypothesizing an impact of the price-volume relationship on the pricing of 
NYSE seats. The price-volume hypothesis applied to NYSE aggregate trading volume and the NYSE 
equity index also implies a corresponding level of systematic risk in the pricing of NYSE seats. NYSE 
seats derive value from the trading opportunities granted by seat ownership. Thus seat prices should 
represent the capitalized value of these trading opportunities and reflect the value placed on liquidity 
provision. If the price-volume relationship does not hold, aggregate trading volumes would be 
symmetrical in up and down markets, implying that the ownership of profits from trading volume 
should show little systematic risk.   
Our study covers the period: 1879-1908. The study tests the “liquidity-trading” hypothesis that trading 
volume is positively related to call-loan rates, and tests the “price-volume hypothesis” that trading 
volume is positively related to the NYSE stock-price index. These two hypotheses create links between 
the monetary phenomena of deflation and reflation and the impact on market liquidity in terms of 
trading volumes and the pricing of NYSE seats. Furthermore, the study tests through a cointegration 
analysis whether the liquidity-trading and price-volume relationships create an equilibrium relationship. 
Given the long period of deflation and then reflation, the cointegration analysis allows the study to test 
the cumulative effects of study variables over the sample period.  
Finally, while the study focuses on trading volumes and seat prices, it does not examine the direct 
impact of deflation and reflation on NYSE stock prices, which is likely intermediated by a firm‟s 
capital structure and how its profitability is impacted by deflation and reflation. Davis, Neal and White 
(2003) discuss how railroad companies were unable to repurchase their high-yield, non-callable debt as 
bond yields fell and bond prices rose. As well, declining agricultural and commodity prices likely 
pressured the profitability of mining and railroad firms listed on the NYSE. However, a study of these 
relationships is beyond the scope of the present study. Similar comments apply to how deflation and 
reflation impacted call-loan rates during this period. Saunders (2000) discusses the general impact of 
deflation and inflation on nominal interest rates. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the institutional structure of NYSE 
trading and seat ownership during our sample period. Section III describes the data set analyzed. 
Section IV presents univariate time-series analyses of our study variables. Then section V presents our 
cointegration analysis of the trading-volume variable, and tests the two hypotheses raised above 
concerning trading volumes. Section VI then presents a cointegration analysis of NYSE seat prices. In 
section VII a CAPM analysis of seat prices is presented for comparison with Davis, Neal and White 
(2007) and Schwert (1977). Conclusions follow in Section VIII. 
 
2. NYSE Seat Ownership, Institutional Structure and Short Sale Restraints  
This section explores the institutional and regulatory setting of NYSE seat ownership and trading for 
the 1879-1908 study period. First, NYSE seat ownership structure is examined through data compiled 
from Faye (1873), published by Evening Post Steam Presses, which lists the name, company or 
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partnership affiliation and professional address of seat owners. Next the study relates the NYSE‟s floor 
trading to the ownership results. Finally, the regulatory and institutional structure of short selling is 
discussed.  
2.1 NYSE Ownership Structure 
NYSE seat-ownership structure has implications for the pricing of NYSE seats. Seat ownership 
represents a unique asset class, since revenues are derived from the trading activities of brokers and 
market makers on the NYSE floor. If NYSE ownership was held largely by floor brokers and market 
makers, whose fortunes were tied closely through commissions and spreads to trading volumes, then 
seat prices would reflect those factors affecting trading volumes. However, if NYSE seats were held by 
large, broadly-diversified financial firms, non-systematic trading risks could be diversified away (Note 
2).
 
For example, the impact of deflation and reflation on trading profitability might be diversifiable, 
perhaps through asset classes such as bonds that might be positively impacted by deflation (Note 3). 
Figure 1 graphs the frequency distribution of NYSE seat ownership by type of owner affiliation.  
 
 
Figure 1. Frequency Histogram of Firm Types of NYSE Seat Owners 
 
The data presented in Figure 1 is compiled from Faye (1873), published by Evening Post Steam Presses, 
which lists the name, company or partnership affiliation and professional address of seat owners. 
Shown in the figure is the number of seatholders affiliated within a common corporate or partnership 
affiliation.  
Note that in 1869 there were 1,060 NYSE seats that resulted from the merger of three exchanges. In 
addition, in 1879 40 new seats were sold at $13,000 each to finance construction of a new building for 
the NYSE. However, the total number in our database portrayed above is 799 seats. As suggested by 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jepf             Journal of Economics and Public Finance                 Vol. 2, No. 1, 2016 
110 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
Davis, Neal and White (2007), seats owned by out-of-town and foreign traders reduced the number of 
active traders on the NYSE floor. 99.08 percent of the firms in our database were located near the 
NYSE in lower Manhattan. As well, according to Davis, Neal and White (2007), on any given day the 
number of active brokers on the floor of the exchange “was estimated to be approximately 970 city 
members less 150 inactive seats”. 
In Figure 1, “0” gives seats held without a listed corporate or partnership affiliation, while “1” (“2”, “3”, 
“4” and “5”) represents 1 (2, 3, 4, 5) seat owner(s) affiliated within one Wall Street firm. 469 of the 799 
seats (58.7 percent) were listed as unaffiliated, while 196 (114, 18, 1 and 1, respectively) of seat owners 
were affiliated together within one Wall Street firm. Thus, the majority of seat-holders were 
un-affiliated, and might represent “independent” and/or “2-dollar” brokers, who executed trades for 
other brokerage houses and seat-holders, respectively. 196 of 799 seats (24.5 percent) were single 
seat-owner firms. 114 of 799 seats (14.3 percent) were firms with two seat holders affiliated within a 
firm (Note 4).
 
The data indicates little evidence of institutional concentration of NYSE seat ownership 
(Note 5). The conclusion is that seat holder interests were tied closely to their trading activities on the 
NYSE floor.  
The small size of NYSE firms during our sample period may have nonetheless provided valuable 
functions. The NYSE‟s overnight settlement process was complex and labor intensive (McSherry & 
Wilson, 2013) and might have required one seat owner‟s time to deal with over certification and other 
aspects of trade settlement that could not be done by clerks employed by a commission house. A second 
seat owner‟s time might be required to deal with retail customers, managing customer orders and 
over-seeing security deposits (Note 6). Finally, an additional seat owner might specialize in the floor 
execution of trades. Therefore, the optimal size of a firm specializing in a retail business might have 
been two or three seat owners. In contrast, unaffiliated and single-seat owner firms might specialize in 
speculative trading (termed stock jobbers) or providing trading services. 
The relatively simple structure of NYSE ownership lends support to the conclusion that trading during 
our study period was relatively primitive, dominated by retail investors, was less regulated and with 
limited market-maker support. Davis, Neal and White (2003) observe that NYSE commission houses 
used branch networks to collect retail security orders from across the United States and internationally. 
As well, mutual funds (as institutional investors) were largely absent during the study period (Note 7). 
Finally, there was some trading regulation set by the NYSE and by state regulation, but federal 
regulation was absent. As Griffin et al. (2007) show, we might expect to find a stronger price-volume 
relationship under these conditions. 
2.2 NYSE Trading and Institutional Structure 
Michie (1986) and Meeker (1922) describe the floor-trading specializations among NYSE members. 
Mitchie (1986, p. 183) states that “As early as 1865” stockjobbers had appeared who traded on their 
own account. Meeker (1922, p. 47) further divides stockjobbers into odd-lot dealers, floor traders and 
specialists, and describes $2 brokers as members who assisted commission houses in executing their 
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orders, particularly in heavy markets (Note 8) (Note 9):  
Under the NYSE‟s commission law, commissions were fixed at 1/8 of one percent of a security‟s par 
value. Mitchie (1986) cites that “The commission law is the fundamental principle of the Exchange, 
and on its strict observance hangs the financial welfare of all the members and the life of the Institution 
itself”. Therefore, for independent brokers and $2 brokers trading volume was critical to their 
profitability as seat-holders, while the profitability of floor traders and other stockjobbers would 
depend both on volume and the spreads they were able to realize. The NYSE‟s commission law 
reinforces the importance of trading volumes to the profitability of seat owners.  
2.3 Short Sales 
According to McGavin (2010), the New York state legislature banned short selling in 1792, which was 
circumvented within a few weeks by the Buttonwood Agreement. Jones (2008) and Meeker (1975, p. 
114, p. 237) cite that the New York state legislature again banned short sales in 1812, but repealed the 
ban in 1858. Meeker (1975, p. 115) notes that after the 1907 Panic, the Hughes Commission of 1909 
and the Pujo Investigation of 1912-1913 refused to recommend a ban on short sales. Then in 1917 the 
NYSE required all brokers to confidentially identify short sellers, due to fears of market disruption 
during WW I (Meeker, 1975, p. 122). Federal regulation of short selling began with creation of the SEC 
under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC instituted the uptick rule in 1938, and naked 
short selling was banned in 2005. 
Therefore, for our sample period there was no outright ban on short sales at the NYSE. In terms of 
institutional structure, Meeker (1922) discusses the existence of a “loan crowd” on the exchange floor, 
where brokers seeking to lend or borrow shares met. To affect a short sale, the broker with the short 
interest would borrow the shares within the loan crowd, and would in turn make a loan to the lending 
broker equivalent to that day‟s market value of the shares shorted. The loan came due when the short 
was covered. The cost to the client of shorting was the sales commissions for selling, and then covering, 
the shorted stock, plus any dividends paid by the stock while shorted. This process of short selling 
appears to have been well organized within the exchange. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Data  
Our sample period starts January 1879, when the NYSE trading-volume series begins, and ends 
December 1908 to capture the impact of the 1907 Panic. This data period is divided into two 
sub-periods: (1) 1979-1896, a period of general price deflation, and (2) 1897-1908, when prices 
showed reflation due to new gold discoveries. 
Our monthly data includes five series, namely:  
1) Index of The General Price Level for the United States obtained from FRED (Federal Reserve 
Economic Data) (series M04051USM324NNBR),  
2) Median call-loan rates compiled from weekly data taken from The Commercial and Financial 
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Chronicle, 
3) NYSE Stock Index taken from Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Peng (2001), 
4) NYSE trading volume compiled from NYSE Total Sales: 1879-1934 (NYSE Archives), 
5) NYSE seat prices compiled from the NYSE Committee on Admissions‟ Transfers of Membership: 
Volumes 1 (1869-1905) and 2 (1905-1934). NYSE seats began trading in October 1868, when 
memberships first became saleable (Note 10) (Note 11) (Note 12). 
Figures 2-6 present graphs of our principal study variables, with each series natural log (Ln) 
transformed. The time period covered in each figure is 1879-1908. 
 
 
Figure 2. Ln of U.S. General Price Index: 1879-1908 
Note: The historical price data is taken from http://www.research.stlouisfed.org/fred2 and from 
http://www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory/contents/chapter04.html  
 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) conclude that a period of sustained deflation lasted approximately over 
the period: 1867-1897. We term this period as the “Great Deflation period”. A period of reflation then 
follows.  
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Figure 3. Median Call Loan Rates: 1879-1908 
 
Figure 3 plots median call loan rates over the sample period. Call loan rates were compiled from 
weekly data taken from The Commercial and Financial Chronicle. Graphed here is the median of the 
weekly rates observed for that month. 
 
 
Figure 4. Ln of NYSE Stock Market Index: 1878-1909 
 
Figure 4 depicts an index of the valuation of all NYSE equity shares for the period: 1878-1909. The 
index data is from Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Peng (2001).   
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Figure 5. Ln of Monthly NYSE Stock Trading Volume: 1879-1908 
 
Figure 5 depicts monthly aggregate trading volume for the years 1879 through 1908. A period of 
declining trading activity from roughly 1882 through 1896 appears to reflect the impact of deflation on 
both NYSE stock prices (Figure 4) and trading volumes. This may reflect the so-called “price volume 
relationship” from the market microstructure literature. The data on trading volumes is compiled from 
the volume: Total Sales; Stocks, Gov‟t, State, & R. R. Bonds; New York Stock Exchange (Source: 
NYSE Archives). 
 
 
Figure 6. Ln of NYSE Seat Prices Averaged Monthly: 1876-1908 
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Figure 6 depicts the mean monthly value of NYSE memberships (seats) for the period 1876-1908. Note 
that after an initial rise, a declining trend in seat prices may reflect the impact of deflation. In the late 
1890s, seat prices rose dramatically as market valuations recovered and trading volumes grew rapidly. 
For some months no seat sales were recorded, and one-month lagged values were substituted to 
maintain continuity of the data. The data is compiled from the NYSE Committee on Admissions: 
Transfers of Membership; Volume 1 (1869-1905) and Volume 2 (1905-1934). 
Figure 2 shows a long period of fairly sustained price deflation through 1896, followed by a sharp 
reversal to price reflation through 1908. The period of reflation appears steeper and with less volatility. 
Friedman and Schwartz (F&S, 1963, p. 32) credit the deflation to the spread of agricultural and mining 
as the West closed, along with the stringency of the gold standard at the time, and credit the reflation to 
new gold discoveries and improved gold mining and refining technologies. 
Figure 3 shows the time series of monthly call-loan rates. Call-loan rates spike during the various 
panics of the study period. Figures 4 and 5 suggest that NYSE stock prices and trading volumes 
showed somewhat similar overall trends to the deflation and reflation trends in Figure 2 (Note 13). A 
low monthly total trading volume of a mere 2,795,846 shares occurred May 1896 during the deflation 
period, while high monthly trading volumes of 14,403,784 shares occurred earlier (December, 1886) 
during the deflation period, and 42,138,208 shares (April, 1901) during the reflation period. The NYSE 
stock price index peaked in May 1881 at a level that would not be reached again until December 1900; 
thus spanning just over 19 years. The stock-price index reached lows in December 1884 and again July 
1893. Overall, the stock-index and trading-volume series showed an overall downward trend during the 
deflation period, and then moved sharply higher with reflation.  
Finally, in Figure 6 seat prices peaked in the early 1880s and then showed a declining trend until the 
monetary expansion of the late 1890s. As noted above NYSE seats began trading in October 1868. The 
peak seat price was $33,667 (12/1885) during the deflation period, and then reached a low seat price of 
$15,000 in September 1896. Finally, during the reflation period seat prices reached a high of $93,000 in 
February 1906, the highest ever seat price of our sample period.  
3.2 Single-Series Time Series Analysis and Sample Statistics 
Table 1 presents Box-Jenkins analyses of the Ln transformed series of the study. Results are presented 
separately for the deflation (1879-1896) and reflation (1897-1908) periods. We make the following 
observations: 
1) Most series show unit roots, including the price-level (Ln Price Level), stock-index (Ln Stk Index) 
and seat-price (Ln Seat price) series. The two exceptions are the call-loan rate (Ln call-loan rate) and 
the trading-volume (Ln Trade Vol) series, both of which show significant AR 1 terms (p = 0.000) in 
both periods.  
2) Several series show significant autoregressive (AR) and/or moving average (MA) terms, which 
imply some level of predictability to these series. Ln Price Level shows a significant MA 2 component 
during the deflation period (p = 0.003) and a significant MA 10 term for the reflation period (p = 0.007), 
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along with its significant unit root (Note 14). The Ln Trade Volume series shows significant MA 
components during the deflation period, along with the significant AR 1 term. The Ln Stk Index also 
shows a significant AR 2 term during the reflation period, along with its unit root. 
 
Table 1. Single-Series Time-Series Analyses 
Reflation = 0 
 Identified Stationary ARIMA model Parameters 
Series Model R
2
% R
2
%  Estimate (S.E.) p-value 
Ln Price Level: ARIMA (0, 1, 2) 97.7 3.9 MA 2: -0.201 (0.068) 0.003 
Ln Call Loan Rate: ARIMA (1, 0, 0) 79.1 79.1 Constant: -5.556 (0.136) 0.000 
    AR 1: 0.777 (0.047) 0.000 
Ln Stk Index: ARIMA (0, 1, 0) 90.3 17.8    
Ln Trade Vol: ARIMA (1, 0, 3) 46.4 46.4 Constant: 15.638 (0.119) 0.000 
    AR 1: 0.969 (0.030) 0.000 
    MA 1: 0.347 (0.076) 0.000 
    MA 2: 0.273 (0.075) 0.000 
    MA 3: 0.157 (0.073) 0.032 
Ln Seat Price: ARIMA (0, 1, 0) 93.6 26.1    
Reflation = 1 
 Identified Stationary ARIMA model Parameters 
Series Model R
2
% R
2
%  Estimate (S.E.) p-value 
Ln Price Level: ARIMA (0, 1, 10) 99.4 38.1 Constant:
  
0.002 (0.0004) 0.000 
    MA 10: 0.247 (0.090) 0.007 
Ln Call Loan Rate: ARIMA (1, 0, 0) 43.7 43.7 Constant: -5.723 (0.152) 0.000 
    AR 1: 0.626 (0.066) 0.000 
Ln Stk Index: ARIMA (2, 1, 0) 98.4 9.0 AR 2: 0.337 (0.080) 0.000 
Ln Trade Vol: ARIMA (1, 0, 0) 54.2 54.2 Constant: 16.411 (0.123) 0.000 
    AR 1: 0.772 (0.053) 0.000 
Ln Seat Price: ARIMA (0, 1, 0) 98.3 0.0 Constant: 0.010 (0.006) 0.065 
Note: Univariate time-series results are given for the first difference of the natural log (Ln) of: 
(1) Index of The General Price Level for United States (Price Level), 
(2) Call loan rate (Call Loan Rate), 
(3) NYSE Stock Index (Stk Index), 
(4) NYSE Trading Volume (Trade Vol), 
(5) NYSE seat prices (Seat Price), 
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Details concerning these variables are given in the text. 
 
These results suggest that to produce stationary series in a uniform way, all series will be first 
differenced in much of the remaining analyses of the study.  
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the 1
st
 differenced (Ln transformed) series, again split between 
the deflation (1879-1896) and reflation (1897-1908) periods. The table lists the average monthly 
percentage changes as (1) -.0251% and 0.1702% for the general price series, (2) -.3224% and 0.2211% 
for the call-loan rate series, (3) 0.1137% and 0.5040% for the NYSE stock-index series, (4) -.2534% 
and 1.2575% for the NYSE trading-volume series, and (5) 0.6043% and 0.9849% for NYSE seat prices, 
for the deflation and reflation periods respectively. The seat-price result for the deflation period may 
seem anomalously high, but recall that seat sales only came into existence October 1868, and perhaps 
at a below-market price.  
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics (Monthly) for 1
st
 Differences of Ln of Study Variables 
 Deflation Period Reflation Period 
 Mean (%) Std. (%) Mean (%) Std. (%) 
D Ln Price Level: -0.0251 0.9048 0.1702 0.7727 
D Call Loan: -0.3224 69.5935 0.2211 79.7104 
D Ln Stk Index: 0.1137 4.5499 0.5040 3.0607 
D Ln Trade Vol: 0.2534 29.438 1.2575 36.2589 
D Ln Seat Price: 0.6043 7.9431 0.9849 6.6595 
Selected Correlations Among 1
st
 Differenced Ln Study Variables 
 Deflation Period Reflation Period 
 -1 0 +1 S.E. -1 0 +1 S.E. 
D Ln Trade Vol With: 
D Ln Price Level: 0.004 0.123 0.028 0.068 0.009 0.166
*
 0.104 0.084 
D Ln Call Loan: -.057 0.182
*
 0.034 0.068 -.135 0.318
*
 0.077 0.084 
D Ln Stk Index: 0.042 0.196
*
 -.006 0.068 0.201
*
 0.213
*
 0.115 0.084 
D Ln Seat Price With: 
D Ln Price Level: 0.279
*
 0.140
*
 0.159
*
 0.068 0.302
*
 0.217
*
 0.061 0.084 
D Ln Call Loan: -.037 0.024 -.003 0.068 0.047 0.164
*
 -.110 0.084 
D Ln Trade Vol: 0.157
*
 0.025 -.037 0.068 0.424
*
 0.099 -.186 0.084 
D Ln Stk Index: 0.459
*
 0.084 -.049 0.068 0.561
*
 0.162 0.099 0.084 
Note: Means and standard deviation (Std.) of percentage change (first difference of log transformed) 
are listed for each study variable. Also listed are selected correlations involving the key study variables: 
NYSE trading volumes (Trade Vol) and NYSE seat prices (Seat Price). 
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Note that reflation lifted monthly average stock-index returns from 0.1137% to 0.5040%, but lifted 
average trading volumes from -.2534% to 1.2575% for the reflation period, suggesting that the return to 
reflation had a much stronger impact on trading volumes than on the equity index. The next section will 
show that this result is in part due to the asymmetric version of the price-volume relationship. Also, 
note that after trading volumes, seat prices show the second highest growth rate in the reflation period, 
while call loan rates and then trading volumes show the largest percentage declines during the deflation 
period. Finally, the call loan and then trading-volume series show the highest volatilities in both periods, 
while the price-level, stock-index and seat-price series show the lowest volatilities.  
Table 2 also lists selected lag (-1), current (0) and lead (+1) correlations among study variables, with a 
focus on trading volumes and seat prices, the principal dependent variables of our analysis. The 
seat-price series shows positive correlations with the lag, current and lead general price-level series in 
the deflation period, and positive correlations with the lag and current general price level in the 
reflation period, giving some evidence that seat prices anticipated deflation. In both periods, seat prices 
show significant positive correlations with lagged stock-index and lagged trading-volume series. 
Finally, the trading-volume series shows (1) a positive current correlation with the call-loan rate in both 
periods, (2) a positive current correlation with the general price-level series in the reflation period, and 
(3) a positive correlation with current stock-index series in the reflation period, and a positive 
correlation with lag stock-index series in the reflation period.  
3.3 Cointegration Results for NYSE Trading Volume 
This section presents cointegration results to test for an equilibrium relationship of NYSE trading 
volume with general price level, call loan rates, NYSE stock-index values, and NYSE stock-index 
volatility, which is derived from a GARCH (1,1) model. All variables, except the volatility variable, 
have been natural log (Ln) transformed. The results will allow the analysis to test two hypotheses. First, 
the “liquidity-trading” hypothesis that trading-volume changes are positively correlated with changes in 
call-loan rates. Second, the “asymmetric volume-price change” hypothesis that stock-price increases 
have a larger impact on trading volumes than stock-price declines. Cointegration allows the study to 
test whether a stable equilibrium exists among these study variables, and to test the cumulative effects 
of the study variables on trading volumes. 
The cointegration test is whether the residuals from the equilibrium regression are stationary, i.e., that 
the residual series does not random walk away from the equilibrium relationship. The residuals are then 
incorporated into the Error Correction Model (ECM), where the monthly percentage change of NYSE 
trading volume is regressed on the monthly percentage change of: (1) price level, (2) call-loan rate, (3) 
NYSE stock-price index, and (4) the NYSE stock-price index volatility.  
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Table 3. Analysis of NYSE Trading Volume 
Reflation = 0 
Equilibrium Regression: Dependent Variable = Ln Trade Vol, R
2
 = 37.9% 
Series Beta S.E. t-value p-value 
Constant 15.709 0.211 74.612 0.000 
Ln Price Level_O 2.909 0.393 7.392 0.000 
Ln Call Price 0.076 0.023 3.277 0.001 
Ln Stk Index 0.344 0.169 2.036 0.043 
Stk Index Vol 2.529 1.229 2.058 0.041 
Cointegration Test: 
 Identified Stationary ARIMA model Parameters 
Series Model R
2
% R
2
%  Estimate (S.E.) p-value 
Res 1: ARIMA (1, 0, 0) 22.2 22.2 AR 1: 0.471 (0.060) 0.000 
ECM Results: Y Variable = 1
st
 Diff. of Ln Trade Vol, R
2
 = 28.1% 
Series Beta S.E. t-value p-value 
Constant  -.057 0.046 -1.224 0.222 
DLnPrice_O 2.320 2.117 1.096 0.274 
DLnCall 0.121 0.036 3.376 0.001 
DMktVol 1.409 3.146 0.448 0.655 
Dn_DLnIndex -1.981 0.738 -2.685 0.008 
Dn_DLnIndex_1 2.188 1.260 1.737 0.084 
Up_DLnIndex 4.347 0.719 6.041 0.000 
Up_DLnIndex_1 -.880 1.195 -.736 0.462 
LagDRes_1 -.220 0.066 -3.322 0.001 
LagDRes_2 -.250 0.063 -3.972 0.000 
Reflation = 1 
Equilibrium Regression: Dependent Variable = Ln Trade Vol, R
2
 = 52.7% 
Series Beta S.E. t-value p-value 
Constant 15.197 0.482 31.552 0.000 
Ln Price Level_O -1.380 0.814 -1.694 0.092 
Ln Call Loan 0.118 0.814 2.984 0.003 
Ln Stk Index 1.647 0.262 6.290 0.000 
Stk Index Vol 2.674 1.826 1.465 0.145 
Cointegration Test: 
 Identified Stationary ARIMA model Parameters 
Series Model R
2
% R
2
%  Estimate (S.E.) p-value 
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Res 1: ARIMA (1, 0, 0) 29.9 29.9 AR 1: 0.555 (0.070) 0.000 
ECM Results: Y Variable = 1
st
 Diff. of Ln Trade Vol, R
2
 = 41.0% 
Series Beta S.E. t-value p-value 
Constant -.083 0.062 -1.324 0.188 
DLnPrice 2.383 2.492 0.956 0.341 
DLnCall 0.178 0.062 2.860 0.005 
DMktVol 6.294 3.722 1.691 0.093 
Dn_DLnIndex -3.494 1.515 -2.306 0.023 
Dn_DLnIndex_1 6.022 2.606 2.311 0.022 
Up_DLnIndex 9.397 1.472 6.385 0.000 
Up_DLnIndex_1 -1.363 2.262 -.603 0.548 
LagDRes_1 -.390 0.082 -4.723 0.000 
LagDRes_2 -.228 0.076 -2.982 0.003 
 
The “equilibrium regression” tests whether there is an equilibrium relationship between the (natural log 
of) NYSE trading volume (as dependent variable) and the (natural log of) price level, call-loan rate, 
NYSE stock index and NYSE stock-index volatility. The cointegration test is then a test whether the 
residuals from the equilibrium regression are stationary, i.e., the residual does not display a unit root. 
Finally, the Error Correction Model (ECM) estimates the adjustment process as the trading-volume 
series is shocked away from the equilibrium relationship. 
The upper panel of Table 3 gives results for the deflation period. With the Ln Trading Volume 
equilibrium relationship, Ln Stk Index is significant in both periods (p = 0.043 and p = 0.000, 
respectively), in support of the price-volume hypothesis. As well, the Ln Call Loan variable is highly 
significant in both periods (p = 0.001 and p = 0.003, respectively), which supports the 
“liquidity-trading” hypothesis. The Stk Index Vol variable is marginally significant in the deflation 
period. The Ln Price Level_O variable is the general price index orthogonalized to both the call-loan 
rate and stock-index variables to focus the analysis on the study‟s two primary hypotheses. It is highly 
significant in the deflation period but insignificant in the reflation period.  
The cointegration test results are listed next in Table 3. The results indicate that the 
equilibrium-regression residuals are auto-regressive with parameter estimates of 0.471 and 0.555, 
respectively for the two periods. These results indicate mean reversion to the equilibrium relationship.  
Error Correction Model (ECM) results are presented next in each panel. These regressions explore the 
dynamic relationship between NYSE trading volumes and the study‟s independent variables. The ECM 
regressions involve the first differences of the (Ln transformed) study series. As well, for a specific test 
of the asymmetric version of the price-volume relationship, the differenced log stock-price index 
(DLnIndex) variable is divided between down and up stock-index movements, denoted as 
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Dn_DLnIndex and Up_DLnIndex, respectively.  
The ECM results can be summarized as follows: 
1) The impact of changes in call loan rates (DLnCall) is highly significant, with beta estimates of 0.121 
(p = 0.001) and 0.178 (p = 0.005), respectively for each period. Thus, increasing (decreasing) call loan 
rates are associated with increasing (decreasing) trading volumes. These results strongly support the 
“liquidity-trading” hypothesis.  
2) The ECM results also provide strong evidence of an asymmetric impact of percentage NYSE 
stock-index changes (DLnIndex) on percentage changes in NYSE trading volumes. Down (up) 
movements show betas of -1.981 (4.347) and -3.494 (9.397) for the deflation and reflation periods, 
respectively. Thus, the up beta is more than twice the down beta in absolute value. These results give 
strong support to the asymmetric version of the price-volume relationship. Also note that the up betas 
for DLnIndex are much more highly significant than the down betas. Finally, there is also some 
significant evidence of a lag relationship (Note 15). 
3) The first lag (LagDRes_1) and second lag (LagDRes_2) of the first differenced residuals from the 
equilibrium regression are highly significant and with negative beta estimates. These results imply a 
strong mean-reversion of trading-volume changes to the equilibrium relationship.  
4) Finally, the two variables: (1) change in Ln price level (DLnPrice_O), and (2) change in Ln market 
volatility (DMktVol) are not significant in either period. 
Therefore, the results of this section show a strong equilibrium relationship between trading volumes, 
and (1) call loan rates, and (2) NYSE stock-index values. The ECM results are consistent in showing a 
strong relationship between changes in call loan rates and changes in the stock index with changes in 
trading volumes. The results provide strong support for the “liquidity-trading” hypothesis and the 
“asymmetric volume-price change” hypothesis.  
3.4 Cointegration Results for NYSE Seat Prices 
The cointegration tests of the previous section are repeated here with NYSE seat prices. One primary 
interest in this case is a further test of the price-volume relationship. Seat ownership confers the right to 
participate in trading on the floor of the NYSE, and trading volumes are a significant component of the 
profitability of this activity (Note 16). In addition, a significant price-volume relationship would be 
expected to give rise to systematic risk in the pricing of NYSE seats. The price-volume relationship 
would imply that aggregate trading volumes rise and fall with the stock-market index on average. In 
contrast, if the price-volume relationship is not significant, we would expect seat prices to show low or 
no systematic risk, since trading profitability would on average be equal in up and down equity markets. 
In addition, the study tests whether the asymmetric version of the price-volume relationship continues 
to hold with seat prices. 
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Table 4. Analysis of NYSE Seat Prices 
Reflation = 0 
Equilibrium Regression: Dependent Variable = Ln Seat Price, R
2
 = 93.6% 
Series Beta S.E. t-value p-value 
Constant 0.451 0.307 1.471 0.143 
Ln Seat_1 0.873 0.020 43.737 0.000 
Ln Price Level_O 0.050 0.114 0.443 0.658 
Ln Call Loan -.008 0.006 -1.308 0.192 
Ln Trade Vol 0.043 0.018 2.385 0.018 
Ln Stk Index 0.082 0.047 1.752 0.081 
MktVol 0.494 0.319 1.547 0.123 
Cointegration Test: 
 Identified Stationary ARIMA model Parameters 
Series Model R
2
% R
2 
%  Estimate (S.E.) p-value 
Res 2: ARIMA (0, 0, 0) 0.0 0.0    
ECM Results: Y Variable = 1
st
 Difference of Ln Seat Price, R
2
 = 27.4% 
Series Beta S.E. t-value p-value 
Constant  -.004 0.009 -.443 0.658 
DLnPriceO 0.319 0.586 0.544 0.587 
DLnPriceO_1 1.445 0.568 2.546 0.012 
DLnCall 0.011 0.010 1.154 0.250 
DLnCall_1 0.022 0.010 2.070 0.040 
Dn_DLnIndex 0.144 0.202 0.715 0.476 
Dn_DLnIndex_1 0.370 0.207 1.784 0.076 
Up_DLnIndex -.034 0.210 -.160 0.873 
Up_DLnIndex_1 1.001 0.207 4.833 0.000 
DLnTradeVol 0.003 0.018 0.157 0.875 
DLnTradeV_1 0.009 0.018 0.527 0.599 
LagDRes_1 -.014 0.053 -.262 0.793 
LagDRes_2 -.020 0.053 -.378 0.706 
Reflation = 1 
Equilibrium Regression: Dependent Variable = Ln Seat Price, R
2
 = 98.8% 
Series Beta S.E. t-value p-value 
Constant 1.678 0.565 2.971 0.004 
Ln Seat_1 0.754 0.047 16.084 0.000 
Ln Price Level 0.232 0.159 1.455 0.148 
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Ln Call Loan 0.006 0.007 0.784 0.434 
Ln Trade Vol 0.039 0.014 2.815 0.006 
Ln Stk Index 0.379 0.088 4.320 0.000 
MktVol 0.114 0.286 0.398 0.692 
Cointegration Test: 
 Identified Stationary ARIMA model Parameters 
Series Model R
2
% R
2 
%  Estimate (S.E.) p-value 
Res 1: ARIMA (0, 0, 0) 0.0 0.0    
ECM Results: Y Variable = 1
st
 Difference of Ln Seat Price, R
2
 = 49.2% 
Series Beta S.E. t-value p-value 
Constant 0.002 0.009 0.289 0.773 
DLnPriceO 0.625 0.448 1.396 0.165 
DLnPriceO_1 1.180 0.427 2.765 0.007 
DLnCall 0.017 0.011 1.539 0.126 
DLnCall_1 0.022 0.010 2.053 0.042 
Dn_DLnIndex 0.195 0.261 0.747 0.457 
Dn_DLnIndex_1 1.117 0.274 4.080 0.000 
Up_DLnIndex 0.267 0.287 0.929 0.355 
Up_DLnIndex_1 0.926 0.281 3.301 0.001 
DLnTradeVol -.005 0.015 -.372 0.710 
DLnTradeV_1 0.050 0.015 3.476 0.001 
LagDRes_1 -.049 0.065 -.765 0.446 
LagDRes_2 -.145 0.065 -2.227 0.028 
 
The “equilibrium regression” tests whether there is an equilibrium relationship between the (natural log 
of) NYSE seat prices (as dependent variable) and the (natural log of) price level, call-loan rate, NYSE 
trading volume, NYSE stock index and NYSE stock-index volatility. The cointegration test is then a 
test whether the residuals from the equilibrium regression are stationary, i.e., the residual does not 
display a unit root. Finally, the Error Correction Model (ECM) estimates the adjustment process as the 
seat price series is shocked away from the equilibrium relationship. 
Table 4 presents regression results, constructed similarly to Table 3. The dependent variable is the 
natural log of the monthly seat price (Ln Seat Price) and its first difference for the ECM regression. The 
equilibrium regression and cointegration test results are presented first. Note that in this case lagged Ln 
Seat Price is included to obtain an equilibrium relationship. Without including the lagged dependent 
variable, the cointegration tests indicated unit roots in the residuals in both the deflation and reflation 
periods. These residuals are plotted in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7. Residuals from the Equilibrium Regression of Seat Price: 1876-1908 
 
Figure 7 plots residuals from the equilibrium seat price regressions of Table 4 without the addition of a 
lagged dependent variable.  
The rising residual trend on the left side of the figure stands out markedly. It may reflect that trading in 
NYSE seats started just in 1868, and perhaps seats were underpriced at their introduction. As well, the 
figure shows other trends in the residuals, which may reflect behavior influences on seat pricing such 
as anchoring. Alternatively, as discussed by Schwert (1977), seat prices are generally thinly traded and 
thus slow to adjust to market conditions. 
The Table 4 results indicate that lagged Ln Seat Price was by far the most significant factor in the 
equilibrium regression, suggesting that the previous month‟s value served as an anchor in determining 
the current seat price. As well, the cointegration test results indicate that the residual series from the 
equilibrium regression are white noise, in contrast to the autoregressive residuals found with the trading 
volume variable of the previous section. The equilibrium regressions also indicate that the NYSE 
trading-volume and stock-index variables had positive betas and were generally significant in both 
periods. The price-level, call loan and equity-market volatility variables were not significant in either 
period. 
The ECM results are given next in Table 4. One lag of the (1
st
 differenced Ln) study variables are 
included to test for lagged effects. However, the lagged dependent variable was not significant, and 
thus not included.  
To test for asymmetry in the relationship between seat-price changes and stock-index changes, the 
analysis continues to include separate variables for up and down stock-index movements. In the present 
case these variables continue to be generally significant, indicating a significant relationship between 
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stock-index changes and seat-price changes, but the evidence of an asymmetric effect as with trading 
volumes is much weaker. The price-level (DLnPrice) and call-loan (DLnCall) series have a significant 
positive impact on percentage changes in seat prices at a one-month lag in both periods. The 
trading-volume (DLnTradeVol) variable was significant only in the reflation period, and then at a 
one-month lag. Finally, note that the first lag (LagDRes_1) and second lag (LagDRes_2) of the first 
differenced residuals from the equilibrium regression are generally not significant, consistent with the 
cointegration tests just discussed. 
The ECM results give some support to a weak equilibrium relationship of NYSE seat prices with the 
NYSE stock-index and other study variables. The cointegration tests do not indicate mean reversion to 
this relationship, and likewise the ECM regressions do not show a correction to the equilibrium 
relationship.  
The ECM results show a much weaker asymmetric impact of stock-index changes on percentage 
changes in seat prices. One potential explanation for a weaker effect is that seat owners held other 
profit opportunities in periods of low NYSE trading, such as increased trading in commodity markets, 
the curb market, or in foreign markets not subject to the same deflation. Otherwise, we would expect 
seat prices to show the same regression trends as between trading volume and stock index because of 
trading volume‟s impact on seat profitability.  
3.5 NYSE Seat Analysis; Traditional CAPM Approach 
In this section a CAPM regression of NYSE seat-price excess returns is fit for comparison with Davis, 
Neal and White (2007) and Schwert (1977). The dependent variable is the seat-price excess returns. 
Independent variables are (1) excess returns on an NYSE stock-index, (2) NYSE trading-volume 
changes, (3) the call-loan rate changes, and (4) the price-level changes. Two lags of each independent 
variable are included, since as discussed by Schwert (1977), seat prices are thinly traded and thus slow 
to adjust to market conditions. The price-level variable is included to test whether the deflation and 
reflation periods had a direct impact on NYSE seat-price excess returns, independent from the other 
independent variables. 
 
Table 5. CAPM Regression Analysis of Seat Prices 
Dependent variable: NYSE seat price excess return (DLnSeatPrice-rf ) 
Reflation = 0: R-square = 31.1% 
 Beta Std. Error t-value Significance 
Constant  0.003 0.005 0.703 0.483 
DLnStkIdx-rf 0.118 0.108 1.100 0.273 
one-month lag 0.694 0.111 6.266 0.000 
two-month lag 0.204 0.112 1.824 0.070 
DLnTradingVolume 0.011 0.017 0.613 0.541 
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one-month lag 0.029 0.017 1.669 0.097 
two-month lag 0.033 0.017 1.892 0.060 
DLnCall -.002 0.010 -.177 0.860 
one-month lag 0.014 0.010 1.307 0.193 
two-month lag 0.000 0.010 0.027 0.978 
DLnPriceO 0.266 0.574 0.464 0.643 
one-month lag 1.067 0.571 1.869 0.063 
two-month lag -.374 0.561 -.666 0.506 
Reflation = 1: R-square = 44.3% 
 Beta Std. Error t-value Significance 
Constant 0.003 0.004 0.795 0.428 
DLnStkIdx-rf 0.246 0.146 1.687 0.094 
one-month lag 0.942 0.140 6.750 0.000 
two-month lag 0.113 0.150 0.752 0.453 
DLnTradingVolume 0.000 0.014 -.021 0.984 
one-month lag 0.052 0.014 3.670 0.000 
two-month lag -.001 0.014 -.090 0.929 
0.929 0.009 0.012 0.797 0.427 
one-month lag 0.019 0.011 1.744 0.083 
two-month lag -.008 0.011 -.777 0.439 
DLnPrice_O 0.658 0.460 1.432 0.154 
one-month lag 1.008 0.444 2.272 0.025 
two-month lag -.428 0.435 -.985 0.326 
 
The table presents a more conventional CAPM-type regression of seat-price excess returns 
(DLnSeatPrice-rf) on the current value plus two lags of (1) NYSE stock-index excess returns 
(DLnStkIdx-rf), (2) NYSE trading-volume returns (DLnTradingVolume), (3) call-loan rate returns 
(DLnCall), and (4) general price-level returns (DLnPrice_O), where the general price series (LnPrice) 
has been orthogonalized to the call-loan (LnCall) and stock-index (LnStkIdx) series to focus on the 
study hypotheses. 
The Table 5 results indicate that the NYSE stock-index excess returns have a significant impact on 
seat-price excess returns, particularly at the 1-month lag. As noted by Schwert (1977), thin trading in 
the dependent variable (seat price) may result in significant lagged independent variable effects. In 
particular, summing the betas estimated for the current and lagged NYSE stock-market excess returns 
may better estimate the relative market risk of NYSE seat-price excess returns. In this case, 0.118 + 
0.694 + 0.204 yields an estimate of 1.016 for the deflation period and 0.246 + 0.942 + 0.113 yields an 
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estimate of 1.301 for the reflation period, for the systematic risk of seat-price excess returns relative to 
the stock market index excess returns. We interpret this relatively high market beta as further evidence 
of the price-volume relationship. 
The NYSE trading-volume and general price-level changes show only a marginally significant impact 
on seat-price excess returns, while call loan changes were not significant. Trading-volume changes 
should have a strong impact on seat-price changes, since the profitability of exchange seat ownership 
should depend on the volume of transactions realized. But the price-volume relationship may mask the 
impact of trading volumes on seat prices, particularly since the stock-index series is much lower 
volatility that the trading-volume series.  
 
4. Discussion 
This study has sought to test two hypotheses using a study period from 1879-1908, which includes 
extended periods of deflation and reflation. First, the “liquidity-trading” hypothesis is that trading 
volume changes are positively correlated with changes in call loan rates. Second, the „asymmetric 
volume-price change‟ hypothesis is that stock-price increases have a larger impact on trading volumes 
than stock-price declines. Karpoff (1987) relates this asymmetry to the impact of costly short sales on 
trading activity. Griffin et al. (2007) provides an alternative behavioral explanation of asymmetry 
between stock price movements and trading volumes in terms of the participation effect, the disposition 
effect and the over-confidence effect. 
The study results give strong support for both hypotheses. As well, a cointegration analysis shows a 
strong equilibrium relationship between trading volumes, and (1) call loan rates, and (2) NYSE 
stock-index values. Error Correction Model (ECM) results are consistent with this relationship, in 
terms of the significant impact of changes in call loan rates and changes in a NYSE stock index on the 
changes in trading volumes. The results provide strong and consistent support for both the 
“liquidity-trading” hypothesis and the “asymmetric volume-price change” hypothesis. 
The study finds that the NYSE monthly trading-volume series showed much higher volatilities than the 
corresponding NYSE stock-index series. While the monthly change in the log-transformed stock index 
had volatilities of 4.5499% and 3.0607% for the deflation and reflation periods, respectively, the 
monthly change in the log-transformed trading-volume series showed volatilities of 29.438 and 
36.2589, respectively. The asymmetrical price-volume relationship may have contributed to the 
heightened volatilities of the trading-volume series. For example, the monthly average stock-index 
return increased from 0.1137% (deflation period) to 0.5040% (reflation period), while the average 
NYSE trading-volume percentage change increased from -.2534% (deflation period) to 1.2575% 
(reflation period). Thus, trading volumes experienced a much greater rebound from the return to 
reflation, which likely contributed to the volatility of the series as well.  
The study also investigates the potential impact of the deflation and reflation periods on NYSE seat 
prices. The study‟s seat-price regression results are broadly consistent with Schwert (1977) and Davis, 
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Neal and White (2007). These analyses covered the periods: 1926-1972 and 1920-1928, respectively. 
Like these studies the analysis finds evidence of a “Fisher effect”, where inactivity of seat trading can 
result in lag effects of the independent variables, which in our regression are stock market, trading 
volume, call loan and price-level effects. The present study finds that NYSE total trading volume is 
only marginally significant in the CAPM regression of seat prices, like Davis, Neal and White (2007). 
The price-volume relationship may offer an explanation for the lack of a strong relationship, since 
stock-index returns may mask the impact of trading-volume changes on seat-price returns, especially 
given the high volatility of trading-volume changes.  
Finally, the study finds significant evidence that seat prices were underpriced during the early years of 
our analysis. NYSE seats began trading in October 1868, when memberships first became saleable, and 
as a result of the merger in 1869 of 533 seats of the NYSE, 354 seats of the Open Board of Brokers, 
and 173 seats of the Government Bond Department. In 1879 an extra 40 seats were created and sold at 
$13,000 each to finance construction of a new building for the NYSE. Since then the number of NYSE 
seats were fixed at 1,100 well into the 1920s. Seat prices may have been underpriced for similar 
reasons that rights offerings to current shareholders are underpriced, e.g., to ensure participation by a 
broad number of brokers. 
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Notes 
Note 1.
 
Friedman and Schwartz (F&S, 1963, p. 32) date the period of sustained price deflation from 1867 
to the 1896 defeat of Bryan‟s Presidential bid on a free-silver platform. After 1896, a sharp reversal to 
price reflation occurred with new gold discoveries and improved mining and refining technologies. F&S 
credit the cause of deflation primarily to the spread of agricultural and mining as the West closed and as 
transportation improved. F&S (p. 139) conclude that “The defeat of Bryan and his free-silver platform in 
the Presidential election of 1896 is a convenient and dramatic date to mark the turning point”. We 
therefore take the period: 1867-1896 as the “Great Deflation period”. This conclusion is illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
Note 2. Schwert (1977) discusses that seats could be sold only to individuals and not to groups or 
corporations. However, these latter parties could purchase an NYSE seat through an ABC agreement, 
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which is a contract between the employee and purchasing firm that restricts the employee‟s ability to sell 
the seat. 
Note 3. For example, Spear, Leeds, & Kellogg, L. P. (SLK), a specialist firm, held six NYSE seats when 
its merger with The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (GS) was announced September 11, 2000. GS is a 
diversified U.S. financial services firm. SLK was also diversified at the time beyond market making, 
particularly into derivatives trading and clearing services. 
Note 4. The data set of seat owners does include a few well known firms, such as Clark, Dodge & Co. 
with two seats, Drexel, Morgan & Co. with one seat, Jay Cooke & Co. with one seat and Oppenheimer 
Brothers with one seat. However, even these well-known firms did not hold any concentration of NYSE 
seats. 
Note 5. However, according to Davis, Neal and White (2003), there were no limits on the size of a 
brokerage house with a seat on the NYSE, and they did operate branch networks across the United States 
and internationally to collect retail orders. 
Note 6. According to Wikipedia (under “Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation”), before DTC and 
NSCC were formed, brokers physically exchanged certificates, employing hundreds of messengers to 
carry certificates and checks. The mechanisms brokers used to transfer securities and keep records 
relied heavily on pen and paper. The exchange of physical stock certificates was difficult, inefficient, and 
increasingly expensive. According to the source, the Depository Trust Company (DTC) was created in 
1973 to deal with rising trading volumes. 
Note 7. According to Wikipedia, the first mutual funds in the U.S. occurred in the 1890s, but these were 
not popularized until the 1920s. These early funds were closed-end funds. 
Note 8. At the time minimum broker commissions were fixed by NYSE rule at 1/8 of par value for 
non-NYSE members and 1/50 of par for members not acting as principal. Since most stocks had a $100 
par value, independent brokers, who typically transacted overflow business for other members, became 
known as “$2 brokers”. 
Note 9. The NYSE originally formed to enforce a common set of charges, and this remained of 
fundamental importance to the exchange. For example, the Governing Committee (April 1894) stated 
that, “The commission law is the fundamental principle of the Exchange, and on its strict observance 
hangs the financial welfare of all the members and the life of the Institution itself”. In the 1860s it was 
possible to reduce the minimum commission (1/4 percent of par value), by one-half to such important 
customers as bankers and outside brokers. When 1/8 percent became the minimum rate, however, no 
further reductions were allowed. 
Note 10. Up until October 1868, a new member gained admission to NYSE membership by paying a 
membership fee of $3,000 in 1862, which was raised to $10,000 in 1866 (Mitchie, 1986). 
Note 11. At the time and well into the 1920s, the number of NYSE seats was fixed at 1,100, a result from 
the merger in 1869 of 533 seats of the NYSE, 354 seats of the Open Board of Brokers, and 173 seats of 
the Government Bond Department, plus an extra 40 seats that were created in 1881 to pay for expenses. 
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Restricting the number of NYSE seats likely encouraged competition from new exchanges, e.g., the 
Consolidated with 1,225 seats and the Curb with at least 200 seats by 1913 (Meeker, 1922, p. 34). 
Note 12. Seat ownership conferred both the ability to trade on the floor of the exchange and to participate 
in the governance of the exchange. 
Note 13. There are several potential explanations for falling NYSE stock prices over the deflation period. 
Coal and other mining stocks were directly impacted by declining commodity prices. Declining 
agricultural and commodity prices would also pressure railroad earnings. At the time most NYSE-listed 
stocks were from the railroad and mining firms. Falling bond yields also increased the value of corporate 
liabilities (Davis, Neal, & White, 2003).  
Note 14. Cecchetti (1992) examined the Great Depression period and concluded that “beginning in late 
1930, and possibly as early as late 1929, deflation could have been anticipated at horizons of 3-6 months”. 
Perez and Siegler (2003) make similar conclusions about the sharp deflation and then reflation periods 
before WW I, which corresponds to this paper‟s study period. 
Note 15. Griffin et al. (2007) assert that a significant positive relationship between market-wide turnover 
and lagged market-wide returns is consistent with the overconfidence hypothesis. 
Note 16. Schwert (1977, p. 59) asserts that: “assuming the discount rate is constant through time, the only 
thing that would cause seat prices to change over time would be changes in expectations of future share 
volume and stock prices”. 
 
